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This paper analyzes the rationality of Japanese macroeconomic forecasters. It finds that
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11. Introduction
It is now one of the hottest issues in Japan whether Japanese economy is on the way to
recover from the long recession. Many economists release forecasts of the Japanese real
GDP growth rate, most of which are positive for fiscal year 2000. Recent research in
financial economics, however, has shown that economic forecasts are subject to
behavioral biases. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) find that security analysts’ earnings
forecasts are too optimistic and too extreme. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) show that
security analysts under-react to recent actual earnings. Amir and Ganzach (1998) show
that analysts’ forecast changes (i.e. earnings forecasts for the current year minus actual
earnings in the previous year) tend to over-react and that their forecast revisions (i.e.
new earning forecasts minus previous forecasts for the current year) tend to under-react.
Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) find that forecast revisions of short-term interest rates
have a tendency towards over-reaction. Since the same biases may affect Japanese
economists, their forecasts need be carefully interpreted. This paper is the first attempt
to investigate the effects of these biases on the GDP forecasts.
    The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology. Section 3
explains data, and Section 4 reports the results. It finds that Japanese individual
forecasters are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in recession. Furthermore, it finds
that their forecast revisions have a strong tendency towards over-reaction. These are
negative evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis. Section 5 tests whether
reputation models can rationalize these results. When each forecaster’s ability is private
information, rational forecasters mimic what able forecasters will do. Thus forecasters
over-react if and only if abler forecasters tend to do so. Consequently, if concern for
reputation is the main reason for over-reaction, forecasters who change their forecasts
by a large amount ought to have small forecast errors on average. The cross-sectional
analysis in Section 5, however, finds that there is no correlation between each
forecaster’s mean squared forecast revision and mean squared forecast error. Reputation
models cannot explain this result and the biases found in Section 4 together. Section 6
concludes.
2. Methodology
2We follow Amir and Ganzach (1998) and consider two factors that influence forecast
accuracy. If forecasters are optimistic, their forecast errors tend to be positive. If
forecasters over-react to new information, their forecast errors tend to be positive
(negative) when they obtain good (bad) news, i.e. in boom (recession). Therefore the
joint effect of optimism and over-reaction on forecast errors is positive in boom and
indeterminate in recession. Similarly, the joint effect of optimism and under-reaction on
forecast errors is indeterminate in boom and positive in recession. Table 1 depicts these
and other cases.
    Table 1 reveals three important points. First, a positive forecast error does not
necessarily indicate optimism. The reason is that pessimism plus over-reaction (under-
reaction) may cause it when the forecast revision is positive (negative). Secondly, the
set of a positive forecast revision and a negative forecast error needs not imply under-
reaction. Over-reaction plus pessimism may cause it. Thirdly, the sign of the forecast
revision is important when we investigate the joint effect of optimism/pessimism and
over-/under-reaction. The analysis below divides the data into two sub-samples
according to the sign of forecast revision.
    In order to distinguish the effect of optimism/pessimism from the effect of over-
/under-reaction, forecast errors are regressed on forecast revisions. Define ttif
,2−  as
forecaster i’s initial forecast for year t in year 2−t , ttif
,1−  as i’s revised forecast for
year t in year 1−t , and tg  as the actual growth rate of Japanese real GDP in year t.
Then ttti
t
i gfFE −≡
− ,1  is i’s forecast error for year t, and tti
tt
i
t
i ffFR
,2,1 −−
−≡  is i’s
forecast revision for year t. The regression is
(1)      ti
t
i
t
i uFRFE +⋅+= βα
(Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) and Amir and Ganzach (1998) use the same equation). 1
The null hypothesis of rationality is 0=β=α . Positive α  implies optimism, while
negative α  implies pessimism. Positive (negative) β  implies over-reaction (under-
reaction) to new information.
    When we test the above null hypothesis, we must take account of error correlation
across forecasters. Keane and Runkle (1990) and Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) argue
that shocks to the aggregate economy produce forecast errors that are correlated across
3forecasters. Hence we estimate the variance-covariance matrix in the same way as
Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996). The estimated matrix V is
(2)      ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) 11 ˆˆ −− ′′′= ∑ ∑∑ XXuXuXXXV Tt Ni titiNi titi
where tiX  is ( )tiFR,1  if tiFR  is available and ( )0,0  otherwise, X is the 2×TN -stack
of tiX , and 
t
iuˆ  is the residual. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996, p.31) point out that “the
resulting estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of beta [i.e. V] is unbiased under
the null of rational expectations and a quadratic loss function. On the other hand, if
forecast errors are predictable, the resulting estimate will be biased upward by a positive
definite matrix. … They provide extremely robust tests with extremely low power.”
3. Data
Toyo Keizai Inc. has published the forecasts of about 80 Japanese economists in the
January or February issue of “Monthly Statistics (Tokei Geppo)” since 1987. 2 Each
economist makes forecasts of the Japanese real GDP growth rate for the ongoing fiscal
year and that for the next fiscal year. For example, January 1990 issue contains forecasts
for fiscal year 1989 (from April 1989 to March 1990) and fiscal year 1990 (from April
1990 to March 1991). We treat the former as ttif
,1−  and the latter as 1,1 +− ttif . We
exclude the forecasts for fiscal years 1987 ( ttif
,2−  is missing) and 2000 ( tg  is missing),
and use the forecasts for fiscal years 1988 to 1999. We exclude economists who
participate in less than four consecutive surveys, leaving 79 economists. The total
number of forecast sets ( ( )ttitti ff ,1,2 , −− ) is 596, and the average number of observations
per economist is 7.54.
    Among them, the forecast revision is positive in 210 observations, zero in 37
observations, and negative in 349 observations. We split the full sample into two
subgroups, 0≥tiFR  and 0≤
t
iFR . The observations with 0=
t
iFR  are classified
according to the sign of the average forecast revision for year t. The subgroup of
0≥tiFR  consists of 224 observations, while the subgroup of 0≤
t
iFR  consists of 372
observations (Table A1 shows the summary statistics). 3
    As for the actual growth rate tg , Keane and Runkle (1990) argue that the revised
4data introduces a systematic bias because the extent of revision is unpredictable for the
forecasters. For this reason we use the initial announcement of Japanese government
usually released in June.
4. Results
First we check the relation between forecast revisions and forecast errors. Table 2 shows
that, although there is no bias in the full sample, forecast errors tend to be negative
(positive) when forecast revisions are positive (negative). These results appear to (a)
indicate under-reaction and (b) deny either optimism or pessimism, but Table 1 in
Section 2 has shown the counter examples. Hence we use regression analysis below.
    Table 3 summarizes the results of equation (1). The first row is the estimates of the
pooled data. The second and the third rows are the estimates of the sub-samples with
positive forecast revisions ( 0>tiFR ) and negative forecast revisions ( 0<
t
iFR )
respectively. OLS estimates of standard errors are in the upper parentheses, and the
modified standard errors calculated by equation (2) are in the lower parentheses. Note
that the actual standard errors lie between them.
    Table 3 demonstrates strong pessimism and strong over-reaction when the forecast
revision is positive. Both coefficients are significant even if we use the over-estimated
standard errors calculated by equation (2). On the other hand, Table 3 indicates strong
optimism and strong over-reaction when the forecast revision is negative. α  becomes
insignificant but β  remains significant when we use the over-estimated standard errors.
4 Overall, the regression results of equation (1) clearly reject the rational expectations
hypothesis.
5. Rationality
Section 4 has shown that Japanese economic forecasters are jumpy in both boom and
recession. An open question is whether they over-react for strategic reasons. To address
this issue, let us consider the simple reputation model Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996)
present. Forecasters privately obtain signals about the growth rate of the ongoing year in
March and August, and they make forecasts after receiving each signal. The quality of
the signal received in March is identical for all forecasters, but the quality of the signal
5received in August varies across forecasters. Each forecaster’s ability is private
information.
    In this model, abler forecasters attach larger weight on the second signal and thus
make larger forecast revisions in August. Then (a) rational forecasters revise their
forecast excessively in August to make them look able, but among them (b)
incompetent forecasters make smaller revisions on average because they cannot rely on
their low quality signals received in August. Consequently, the magnitude of average
forecast revisions will be negatively correlated with the magnitude of average forecast
errors across forecasters (We can obtain the same conclusion from other reputation
models because rational forecasters have an incentive to over-react if and only if abler
forecasters tend to over-react).
    We test the above implication by the following regression:
(3)      iii uFRFE +⋅β+α=
where iFE  ( iFR ) is the mean squared forecast error (forecast revision) of forecaster i.
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates of this regression. It also reports the rank correlation
coefficient of iFE  and iFR  since iu  in equation (3) is not normally distributed.
    As shown in Table 4, there is little correlation between iFE  and iFR  in either
sample. 5 It indicates that forecasters’ strategic behaviors are not the cause of over-
reaction found in Section 4.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigated the GDP forecast data of Japanese individual economists, and
obtained the following results. First, they are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in
recession. Secondly, they revise their forecasts excessively. Thirdly, there is no relation
between the magnitude of average forecast errors and the magnitude of average forecast
revisions. Since neither the rational expectations hypothesis nor reputation models can
account for these results consistently, it lends considerable support for behavioral
explanations.
6Notes
1. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Amir and Ganzach (1998) analyze the relation
between forecast changes and forecast errors. When we apply their analysis to GDP
forecasts, the equation becomes
      ( )1,1,1 −−− −β+α=− tttittti gfgf
where 1−tg  is the actual growth rate in year 1−t . However,
      i∀   ( )1,11,1 −−−− −+−=− tttittttti gfgggf
for given year t. Therefore the estimated coefficients have little theoretical meaning if
the number of forecaster is large relative to the time-series dimension (β  will be
positive unless the data contains sufficient number of observations such that the
absolute value of 1,1 −− − ttti gf  is large and ( )( ) 01,1,1 <−− −−− tttittti gfgf ). The same
problem occurs when we replace 1−tg  with the average of ttif
,2−  as Ehrbeck and
Waldmann (1996) do.
2. Ashiya and Doi (forthcoming) also use this data, and investigate the relation between
economists’ age and the degree of herding.
3. We obtain similar results when we exclude the observations with 0=tiFR  from the
data.
4. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) find over-reaction but do not find either optimism or
pessimism in the U.S. bond market (They do not investigate the divided data). Amir
and Ganzach (1998) investigate the earnings forecasts and find (a) optimism and
under-reaction in the pooled data, (b) over-reaction in the sub-sample of 0>tiFR ,
and (c) optimism and strong under-reaction in the sub-sample of 0<tiFR . One
reason why only security analysts in the sub-sample of 0<tiFR  tend to under-react
is that, when they receive negative information, they have an incentive to shade their
forecasts to retain good relation with company management (Francis and Philbrick
(1993) find evidence that supports this argument). Of course, GDP forecasters in our
sample are free from such pressures.
5. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) find positive correlation between the mean squared
forecast revisions and the mean squared forecast errors.
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8Table 1. The joint effect of optimism (pessimism) and over-
reaction (under-reaction) on forecast errors.
Positive revision Negative revision
Effect Joint effect Effect Joint effect
+ +Optimism &
Over-reaction +
+
−
?
+ +Optimism &
Under-reaction
−
?
+
+
− −
Pessimism &
Over-reaction +
?
−
−
− −
Pessimism &
Under-reaction −
−
+
?
9Table 2: The outcome of forecast errors
0<tiFE 0=
t
iFE 0>
t
iFE Total
Full sample   264   72   260  596
0>tiFR   126   26    72  224
0<tiFR   138   46   188  372
Note: ttti
t
i gfFE −≡
− ,1  and tti
tt
i
t
i ffFR
,2,1 −−
−≡
  
10
Table 3: The effect of forecast revision ( tiFR ) on forecast error (
t
iFE )
Model: ti
t
i FRFE β+α=
   α  (s.e.) β  (s.e.)  2R Obs.
Full sample 0.038 (0.039) a 012.0−  (0.023) a 0.000 596
(0.223) b   (0.064) b
0>tiFR    376.0−  (0.063)*** a   0.224 (0.061)*** a 0.053 224
(0.215)** b     (0.088)*** b
0<tiFR 0.419 (0.080)*** a   0.154 (0.041)*** a 0.034 372
(0.502) b     (0.115)* b
Notes
a: OLS estimates.
b: Calculated without imposing restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of forecast errors, except that forecast
errors at different times are assumed to be uncorrelated.
***: Significant at the 0.01 level.
**: Significant at the 0.05 level.
*: Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4: Cross-sectional effect of average forecast revision
Model: ii FRFE ⋅β+α=   where ( )2avg tii FEFE ≡  and ( )2avg tii FRFR ≡
  α   (s.e.)    β   (s.e.)       2R    Rank correlation a
Full sample 0.838 (0.078) b 023.0−  (0.025) b   0.000 031.0−
0>tiFR 0.400 (0.070) b 016.0−  (0.048) b   0.000   0.096
0<tiFR 1.091 (0.092) b 024.0−  (0.021) b   0.003 118.0−
Notes
a: Rank correlation is obtained from a separate regression replacing the variables with their ranks.
b: OLS estimates.
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Table A1: Summary statistics
Full sample  0>tiFR  0<
t
iFR
Avg. of tiFR  6279.0−   0.8411 5124.1−
S.D. of tiFR   1.5476   0.6157   1.2358
Avg. of tiFE   0.0453 1879.0−   0.1858
S.D. of tiFE    0.8789   0.5737   0.9934
Observations    596    224    372
  
